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Abstract
Deep neural networks have demonstrated high accuracy in image classification tasks.
However, they were shown to be weak against adversarial examples: a small perturbation
in the image which changes the classification output dramatically. In recent years, several
defenses have been proposed to solve this issue in supervised classification tasks. We
propose a method to obtain robust features in unsupervised learning tasks against adversarial
attacks. Our method differs from existing solutions by directly learning the robust features
without the need to project the adversarial examples in the original examples distribution
space. A first auto-encoder A1 is in charge of perturbing the input image to fool another
auto-encoder A2 which is in charge of regenerating the original image. A1 tries to find the
less perturbed image under the constraint that the error in the output of A2 should be at
least equal to a threshold. Thanks to this training, the encoder of A2 will be robust against
adversarial attacks and could be used in different tasks like classification. Using state-of-art
network architectures, we demonstrate the robustness of the features obtained thanks to this
method in classification tasks.
1 Introduction
Neural networks and particuraly convolutional neural networks have shown impressive results
in many different tasks in computer vision such as object detection, image recognition and
segmentation. A down side of these networks is their lack of robustness as described in (4), (6),
(21). Indeed, imperceptible perturbations of the input (image, sound) can confuse the network
and completely change the prediction. This kind of input is described as an ”Adversarial
Example”. This misclassification could threaten the security and the safety of critical systems.
By using the concept of adversarial examples it is possible to design algorithms in order to
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generate inputs that will modify the prediction with a high rate of succes and a very little
perturbation. Those algorithms are known as ”Adversarial Attacks”. We commonly distinguish
two types of attacks. White box attacks: when the network architecture as well as its weights
are known. Black box attacks: when they are not known by the attacker. Our work is focused
on untargeted white-box attacks computed using different attack methods.
The field of adversarial generation is an active research field, many methods have been
developped in order to generate adversarial example as described in (22). In this work we use
five of the most used attack methods in litterature: The Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM)
(4), Iterative FGSM (7), Single Pixel attack and LocalSearch (13) and Deepfool (11). Those
methods are gradient-based or score-based aproaches that try to find the minimal perturbation
that will modify the model prediction. Several studies have conjectured that this lack of robustness
comes from the fact that the adversarial examples are out of the datasets distribution, near the
border of decision. Different methods have been developped in order to be robust against
adversarial attacks. Some strategies try to project the adversarial examples in the original
distribution as in (9), (17), (18). Other approaches propose to add adversarial examples into
the training dataset (21), (4), (11), similar to data augmentation. Finally new methods like
(12) transform the input data such as it is less sensible to perturbations. The problem with
those methods is that they are attack-specific and then not efficient against new or simply
different attacking method. Recently new methods proposed to learn the attacking et defending
concept using neural networks. Some methods use Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs)
to generate adversarial examples as in (17), (19), (8) or Auto-Encoders as in (3), (20), (1). This
paper is an attempt to increase an autoencoder(A2) robustness by adversarial training, using
another autoencoder(A1) used to generated perturbed images during training. This new method
computes robust features without the need to add any additional networks. Only the weights of
the network are modify to obtain a robust network without loss of performance.
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2 Related Work
2.1 Attack strategies
Many attack strategies have been proposed, which can be classified in two categories: black-box
and white-box attacks. White-box attacks have access to all the weights and gradients of the
classifier while Black-box strategies have access only to the predictions of the network. In this
work we will focus on white-box attacks. We use two kinds of white-box attacks, gradient-based
and score-based. Gradient-based methods are:
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) Given an image x and its corresponding label y, the
FGSM attack sets the perturbation δ to:
δ =  · sign(∇xJ(x, y)) (1)
FGSM (4) uses the sign of the gradient at each pixel to determine the direction with which to
change the corresponding pixel value.
DeepFool DeepFool (11) perform an iterative attack with a linear approximation in order
to find the closest distance from the original input to the decision boundary of adversarial
examples. If f is a binary differentiable classifier, they used an iterative method to approximate
the perturbation by considering f is linearized around xi at each iteration. The minimal perturbation
is computed as:
argmin
ηi
||ηi||2
s.t.f(xi) +∇f(xi)Tηi = 0
(2)
This result can also be extended to the multi-class classifier by finding the closest hyperplanes.
DeepFool provided less perturbation and reduced intensity compared to FGSM and BIM.
Score-based methods are:
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Single Pixel Change the value of a random pixel to the min or max value of the image. If the
perturbed image is not fooling the classifier, the pixel value is reseted to it original value and
the algorithm choose another random pixel. The method is iterative and stop if an adversarial
image is generated or if the max-step limit is reached.
Local Search Use a local search procedure to find a pixel (or a group of pixels) that is critical
for the classfifier robustness and then modify it value to generate adversarial images. Doing this
there might exist a pixel (or a group of pixels) in the adversarial image whose coordinate value
could lie outside the valid range of image values. The LocSearchAdv algorithm finds pixel
locations to perturb using and then applies a defined transformation function to these selected
pixels to generated an adversarial image.
2.2 Defense strategies
Mutiple defense methods have been used to increase robustness of deep neural networks against
adversarial attacks. This section describes the most used strategies.
Adversarial training Adversarial training is an intuitive methods consisting of augmenting
the training dataset with adversarial example. Thi method is efficient to increase robustness
against the adversarial examples used in training. The main issue with this methods is that
it is attack-agnostic and badly transfers to new adversarials examples not used in training.
Additionally, it tends to make the model more robust to white-box attacks than to black-box
attacks due to gradient masking.
Defensive distillation Defensive distillation (15) is a method in which a classifier is trained
in two rounds using a variant of the distillation (5) method. This induce learning a smoother
network and reducing the amplitude of gradients around input points, increase the robustness
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against adversarials. This method have been proven to be inneficient against new, black-box
attacks (2).
Adversarial Detectors Another idea of defense is to detect adversarial examples (10). For
each attack generating method considered, a deep neural network classifier (detector) is trained
to tell whether an input is normal or adversarial. The detector was directly trained on both
normal and adversarial examples. It showed good performance when the training and testing
attack examples were generated from the same process and the perturbation was large enough,
but it did not generalize well across different attack parameters and attack generation processes.
MagNet MagNet (9) is a method based on adversarial detectors strategy. It trains a reformer
network (which is an auto-encoder or a collection of auto-encoders) to move adversarial examples
closer to the manifold of legitimate, or natural, examples. It was proven to be an effective
strategy against gray-box attacks where the attacker is aware of the network architecture and
defenses but do not know it parameters.
3 Proposed Method
The previously described defense methods provide intuition on what can make a network
robust to adversarial examples. Our strategy differs from them by doing sort of adversarial
training with data generated thanks to a separated network during training. The generating
network is used only in training, and not in inference unlike in the Adversarial Detectors
strategies. This paper is focused only on unsupervised learning strategies, this is the reason
why we decided to use Auto-Encoders. An auto-encoder is a deep neural network composed by
an encoder responsible of deep features extraction from input image and a decoder responsible
of image re-generation from deep features extracted by the encoder. During training the network
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is optimised in order to generate images similar to input imagse. We propose a defense strategy
to increase robustness against white box attacks using L2 norm and demonstrate its efficiency
against L∞. The strategy used is to train two Auto-Encoders, an attacker: a generator of
adversarial examples from a given image and a defender: capable to extract the original image
from adversarial examples given by the attacker. The attacker and the defender are trained
simultaneously and adapt themselves all along of the training until convergence. At the end of
training, we expect the deep features extracted by the defender’s encoder to be robust against the
images generated by the attacker and that they could be used in further tasks like classification.
We expect this training method to generate deep features representing a larger distribution of
input images and so increase the robustness of the defending auto-encoder(A2).
χ Attacker Defender χ
Figure 1: Concept Architecture
The goal of the attacker A1 is to find the minimal perturbation which fools the defender A2
with a loss value at least equal to a threshold β. The defender should avoid to be deceived.
min
θdefense
Ex∼χ(Lα(x,Defense(Attack(x, θattack), θdefense))) (3)
min
θattack
Ex∼χ(Lα(Attack(x, θattack), x)) (4)
Under the constraint:
Ex∼χ(Lα(x,Defense(Attack(x, θattack), θdefense))) ≥ β (5)
Where:
χ is the ensemble of distribution examples
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Lα is the loss function : χ, χ→ R
Attack(x, θattack) : χ→ χ with parameters θattack
Defense(x, θdefense) : χ→ χ with parameters θdefense
θattack is the weight of the attacker.
θdefense is the weight of the defender.
NB: The optimization problem under constraint is a not zero-sum game.
3.1 Motivation
Another representation of the problem which could seem more intuitive is to minimize/maximize,
zero-sum game, the final error for the defender/attacker while the adversarial examples are not
too distant to the original image (constraint).
max
θattack
min
θdefense
Ex∼χ(Lα(x,Defense(Attack(x, θattack), θdefense))) (6)
Under the constraint:
Ex∼χ(Lα(Attack(x, θattack), x)) ≤ β (7)
The first representation (Equations 3, 4, 5) is preferred to the second (Equations 6, 7) for two
reasons:
• The attacks against neural networks try to minimize the perturbation of the input, while
the second representation does not.
• The problem optimization is harder to solve because the perturbations generated by state
of art attacks like DeepFool (11) are not on the constraint border (when β is large enough
to accept all types of perturbations).
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During the training, the optimization process will follow these strategies (See figure 2).
• In the first representation: at the begining, the optimizer will reach the border of the
constraint and then it will follow it until reaching the optimum.
• In the second representation, the optimizer will explore the space of solution while continuously
closing the gap with the border, reaching it only at the end of the training.
(a) First representation (b) Second representation
Figure 2: Two representations of the optimization problem.
This is the second reason why the first representation is preferred to the second: the constraint
border is easier to follow. To solve this under constraint optimization problem, we choose to
add the constraint in the training loss:
min
θattack
Ex∼χ(Lα(Attack(x, θattack), x))+
γ ∗max(Ex∼χ(Lα(x,Defense(Attack(x, θattack), θdefense)))− β, 0.0)
(8)
Where γ is big enough to satisfy the constraint. This representation differs from the classic
Lagrangian because we want the constraint gradient part to be free when the constraint is
satisfied. This approximation of the under constraint optimization problem is justified by the
fact that the inequality loss should be equal or close to β.
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3.2 Model and training procedure
The attacker is implemented as an auto-encoder where a uniform random vector and the
features of the encoder are concatenated and then passed through the generator. Adding a
uniform random vector will allow the attacker to generated noise without modifying the ”real”
features. The defender is implemented as a classic auto-encoder. In a first phase, to initialize
the weights of the networks, the two auto-encoders are trained to generate realistic images (the
constraint is ignored, see Equation [3] and [4]).
In the second phase, the weights of the Attackers encoder and the Defenders generator are
fixed. This choice is justified by:
• Attackers encoder: The goal of the attacker is to generate adversarial examples from
given non perturbed examples. Because image information is compressed in the features,
the attacker could be summarized by a generator which has the features generated by the
encoder as inputs, already learned, and a random noise.
• Defenders generator: The goal of the defender is to be robust against adversarial attacks.
This means that the features of adversarial examples should be identical to the features
of non-perturbed examples. This is done by fixing the generator parameters after the
initialization phase, in this manner the features of perturbed input will be generated in the
same way as normal inputs.
During this second phase we optimize the equations [3] and [8].
3.3 Testing procedure
As auto-encoder is an architecture made for unsupervised learning, no classifier is used during
training. In order to be able to used adversarial attacks and evaluate the network robustness a
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classifier is trained with the defenders features generated by the encoder with data coming from
the dataset, not the adversarial data generated by the attacker. The robustness of the classifier
is evaluated against the followings attacks: DeepFool L2 and L∞, Single Pixel, LocalSearch,
FGSM and BIM. Robustness is evaluated by two criteria, the attack success rate and the noise
level of adversarial examples. Noise level is defined by:
Noisei =
√∑
i
(Xi − Advi)2 (9)
Where Xi is the original image and Advi is the generated adversarial example.
4 MNIST Experiments
4.1 Configuration
This method has been evaluated on the MNIST dataset with the following networks:
(a) Attacker architecture (b) Defender architecture
Figure 3: Network architecures
The neural network use convolutions with kernel size 3x3, strides 2x2 and ReLU activation
function. The feature layers are not passed through an activation function. The last layers have
(1 + tanh)/2 as activation function. The batch size is equal to 128.
The Adam optimizer is used with the following learning rates:
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• Defender : Initialization phase = 5 ∗ 10−4, Optimization phase = 10−5
• Attacker: Initialization phase = 10−3, Optimization phase = 10−5
The constants were fixed at γ = 5.0, β = 0.01, the L2 loss is used. The initialization has been
done during 9 epochs and the optimization phase during 31 epochs. Then a classifier is trained
during epochs 20 with Adam (learning rate 10−3, loss: softmax-cross-entropy). The classifier
uses the Defenders encoder (whose weights are fixed) and a hidden dense layer of 64 units with
ReLU activation. NB: The networks have not been optimized for this task and no search was
done for the optimal parameters γ and β. However, several learning rates have been tested to
achieve the presented results: a bad choice of learning rate could imply a non-robust network.
4.2 Results
Adversarial attacks tools Tools have been developped to facilitate adversarial attacks implementation
such as Cleverhans (14) or Foolbox (16). Those tools are open-source Frameworkds that
propose state-of-art algorithms used to generate adversarial examples on any model.
In order to compare our method against a traditional network, we trained a classic autoencoder,
with an architecure similar to Defender architectrure in Figure 3b. We then train a classifier
as previously descripted on each network. After 20 epochs, the classifier achieves an accuracy
around 97% on MNIST test set. Then, the network with classifier is attacked by several methods
on the whole test set, using Foolbox (16)
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Attack Name Classic Auto Encoder Our Method
DeepFool (iter=50 L2) 94,41 % / 1,25 0.54 % / 0.0075
DeepFool (iter=50 L∞) 100 % / 1,81 4.13 % / 1.13
FGSM (=0.005) 0.41 % / 0.07 1.61 % / 0.04
Iterative (=0.005) 1.04 % / 0.08 1.25 % / 0.04
Single Pixel 9.17 % / 1.0 4.72 % / 1.0
LocalSearch 44.41 % / 5.22 27.51 % / 9.71
Table 1: Attack results : Attack Success Rate / Noise Level
* The evaluation is done only on the 1000 first image of the dataset, due to computation time.
**The noise level is the mean of the L2 norm between the original image and the adversarial
image for all successful attacks.
Attack Name MagNet Our Method
DeepFool (iter=50 L∞) 0.6 % 4.13 %
FGSM (=0.005) 3.2 % 1.61 %
Iterative (=0.005) 4.8 % 1.25 %
Table 2: MagNet comparaison
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4.3 Analysis
DeepFool with L2 norm In the previous table we can see that only 0.5 % of attack succeeded
when DeepFool was used with 50 iterations (number of iterations used by the original article
of DeepFool) for a noise level mean around 0.0075. That was expected, as during learning,
the attacker tries to find noise level greater than 0.01 (in fact, equal to like explained above)
which can fool the defender. If the defender succeeded to defend against this level of noise,
we expect to have as good a defense against any level of noise lower than this threshold. The
classifier seems to be robust against L2 DeepFool attacks for 50 iterations. When the number of
deepfool iterations increases, the success rate of the attack slowly increases: for 200 iterations,
1.35% of attack succeeded. Its only when the number of iterations reaches 1000 steps that
the percentage of successful attacks becomes very significant (15.25%). However, the noise
increases significantly at the same time to reach 0.73 which is far from 0.01. We may think
that increasing the threshold would allow to increase the robustness but in the case of MNIST
it is impossible because doing so, the attacker converges to a black image. Indeed, because the
L2 distance between a MNIST image and a black image is around 0.07, it is not possible to
increase the threshold too much.
DeepFool with L∞ norm With the default step used by DeepFool (50 steps), the classifier
seems to be robust (4.13% of success rate) for the L∞ norm. However, the classifier is not
robust when the number of steps increases: at 200 steps, the success rate of the attacks reaches
89.20%. This is the reason why it is important to test DeepFool with several steps which is
unfortunately not often done in the defense literature. However, even with 50 steps, the norm of
the noise is strong with 1.13. This is the reason why it does not necessary mean that the network
is not robust at all against this attack.
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Single Pixel and LocalSearch Even if the number of success of the attack is relatively low
(4.72%), this level of success is higher than what we may expect. In our case this attack looks
more powerful than DeepFool which is designed precisely to minimize the L2 norm. We would
except a result lower than with DeepFool.
Gradient Methods FGSM and Gradient have a high attack success rate, close to 100% for
Gradient Sign and Gradient. This result was expected because the defender is not trained with
this high level of noise, shown by all these methods.
MagNet Comparaison Our method have similar performance to MagNet (9) without using
any adversarial detectors that induces more computation time during inference.
5 Conclusion
Without adding extra computation complexity, like filtering the image or detecting adversarial
images, we demonstrated that a classic network can be robust against L2 attacks by an adapted
unsupervised training procedure. This procedure shows promising results toward robust unsupervised
networks. However, even if it was expected due to the design of the defense, the trained network
is not robust against all types of attacks such as gradient attacks. Further studies should be
focused on a more general defense against different attacks with unsupervised training. We will
also focus our future work on adapting this type of learning procedure to real world datasets
with more complex network architectures.
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